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entiated Market under Asymmetric Information 
Michael Kuhn* 
The paper inquires whether a public eco-label mitigates adverse selection, where an ecologically 
superior (green) product variant is underprovided. A model, integrating entry into a perfectly com-
petitive, vertically differentiated industry and rationally expected quality structure (REQS) under 
asymmetric information, provides conditions for the label, serving as screening device, to increase 
green supply and curb pooling. Perverse reactions entail decreasing green supply,  enhanced pool-
ing, or increasing non-green supply. It is shown that the common single crossing property disre-
gards the impact of changes in REQS on absolute profitability and may misdiagnose firms’ incen-
tives to attain the label. If labelling causes market expansion, pollution may increase even if substi-
tution towards the green variant occurs. However, this only happens if both variants are environ-
mentally sensitive in a well-defined sense. 
JEL classification: L 11, L 15, Q 28 
Keywords: asymmetric information, eco-labelling, entry, market structure, screening, vertical dif-
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1. Introduction 
In recent years many countries have introduced eco-labelling programmes in order 
to promote the establishment and/or growth of a green market, in which firms sell 
an environmentally superior (green) variant of some product to purchasers with a 
willingness to pay for environmental friendliness as a product feature.1 Moreover, 
it is hoped for that substitution away from the environmentally inferior (non-green) 
variant towards the green one takes place so that aggregate pollution is reduced. A 
label is needed in order to overcome the problem of adverse selection, as first dis-
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cussed by Akerlof (1970) in his famous ‘lemons’ article: If consumers are unable to 
identify a product’s true environmental characteristics, non-green producers can 
sell their variant (the lemon) untruthfully as being green and skim off the green 
consumers’ willingness to pay. Rational purchasers anticipate the incentive to cheat 
and lower their willingness to pay accordingly. Green producers may then not be 
able to recover their higher cost of production. This forces them to exit the market 
or reduces their incentive to enter. The market underprovides the green variant and 
the  market structure (in terms of quality) is distorted towards the non-green vari-
ant. 
A centrally administered eco-audit with an associated eco-label can be inter-
preted as a screening mechanism designed to overcome adverse selection by sepa-
rating firms according to their type, green ( g) or non-green ( ). Its type is a firm’s 
private information accessible neither to the labelling-agency nor to purchasers. 
The agency offers the following set of contracts to firms: (i) 'eco-label in exchange 
for an audit report which certifies satisfaction of a pre-set range of criteria' or (ii) 
'no participation'. If auditing is costly and the set of criteria is specified sufficiently 
stringently, option (i) is chosen by 
n
g-producers only and the label separates the 
types.2 Then,  g-producers are able to profit fully from consumers’ willingness to 
pay for environmental friendliness, a  g-industry establishes and the distortion of 
market structure is corrected. Notice that the institutional setting of a centrally ad-
ministered, multi-issue label with voluntary participation corresponds to the ISO 
type I classification of eco-labels. 
From the above follows that eco-labelling evokes two main issues being 
closely interlinked: The informational asymmetry and market structure, the latter 
evolving from entry and competitive interaction. On the one hand, due to the prob-
lem of adverse selection the role of information is crucial for the evolution of mar-
ket structure. On the other hand, factual or expected market – or rather quality - 
structure determines the beliefs of purchasers regarding average environmental 
friendliness, and, in turn, their willingness to pay for the labelled and unlabelled 
variant. As this affects firms’ expected profits, there is an important feed-back of 
(expected) market structure on the incentives to obtain a label. Finally, any conclu-
sions as to the effects of labelling on aggregate pollution can only be drawn with 
reference to market structure. While a brief review of present eco-labelling pro-
grammes shows that the interaction of market structure and informational issues is 
to some extent recognized by labelling-agencies, theoretical models of eco-
labelling have, as to my knowledge, so far ignored it. Mattoo and Singh (1994) 
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analyze market structure effects of eco-labels, but do not address the problem of 
asymmetric information and the mechanisms to resolve it. Schmutzler (1992) and 
Crampes and Ibanez (1996) analyze the signalling character of eco-labels. In both 
cases a monopolist is considered, so that issues of market structure, competition 
and entry are ignored. Dosi and Moretto (1998) study the effect of an eco-label on 
investment decisions in polluting product lines, also in the context of a monopolist 
and without touching informational problems. 
The issues of entry and endogenous market structure and rational expectations 
of average quality under asymmetric information, are integrated in a model of eco-
labelling in order to address the following questions. Under which conditions, by 
which mechanism and to what extent does a centrally administered (type I) eco-
label promote  g-entry, and how are pollution levels affected? In a one period, per-
fect competition setting of a vertically differentiated industry under asymmetric 
information, the effects of a central labelling programme on entry of  g-producers 
are considered. Labelling is based on a costly eco-audit, the result of which can be 
expressed by some eco-index. The auditing outcome can be manipulated to some 
degree. Hence, a  -firm may attain a favourable eco-index, however, always at a 
cost disadvantage. The agency sets a qualification level of the index for awarding 
the label. After this, firms of either type decide on whether to enter the market and 
whether to undergo the audit and attain the label. Observing the qualification level 
and the quantities supplied with and without label, respectively, consumers form 
rational beliefs over average environmental friendliness, and express their de-
mand.3 Trading occurs at market clearing prices. The model is solved for the quan-
tities supplied of the 
n
g- and  -variant with and without label, respectively. Com-
parative statics are used to determine the impact of (small) changes in the qualifica-
tion level on quantities. It should be stressed that the model’s concern with market 
structure does not relate to any form of strategic behaviour, which is precluded by 
its perfect competition nature. Market or quality structure, as the share of 
n
g- and 
-firms (or output) within the two segments - with and/or without label – of the 
differentiated industry, matters for two reasons. On the one hand, it is the target 
variable of labelling policies, on the other hand, it determines consumers’ expecta-
tions. 
n
A crucial assumption of the model is the presence of rational expectations on 
behalf of consumers, who forecast average quality correctly. By determining the 
consumers’ willingness to pay this serves to make the firms’ pay-offs depend on 
the evolving quality structure. It turns out that the types’ decisions on whether to 
attain a label hinge on their impact on absolute profitability. The latter is not taken 
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into account by the traditional single crossing property (SCP), which in the model’s 
terms requires for market separation to be feasible that a tightening in the qualifica-
tion level be strictly more profitable for a  g- vis-à-vis a  -producer (e.g. Gibbons 
1992; Kreps and Sobel 1994). As it focuses on relative profitability only, the SCP 
may misdiagnose the agents’ incentives. The model provides scope for the cases of 
market separation under failure of the SCP and market separation being unfeasible 
under satisfaction of the SCP. In particular, cases may occur in which a tightening 
of the qualification level increases the degree of pooling and/or causes the supply 
of the 
n
g-variant to fall.  
While, in general, the competitive pressure from increased entry of  g-
producers causes  -supply to fall, characteristics of demand are identified under 
which 
n
g-entry increases the supply of the  -variant. For such double expansion of 
the market or for insufficient substitution away from the  -variant introduction of 
an eco-label may increase pollution levels. However, this is the case only if both 
variants are environmentally sensitive in the sense that a small increase in a vari-
ant’s quantity has a positive net impact on pollution with changes in outside con-
sumption being taken into account. 
n
n
A brief review of the literature shows that the interaction of entry decisions, 
market structure and informational issues is only to some extent recognized by 
screening models of quality testing and labelling. Much of the literature presumes 
an exogenous structure of supply with regard to type. The variations of Spence’s 
job market model with a perfect screening technology (Riley 1985)  are a case at 
hand. In a model of imperfect quality testing De and Nabar (1991) take into ac-
count endogenous expectations with regard to the tested and untested market seg-
ment. However, they do not consider the competitive interaction between seg-
ments. Mason and Sterbenz (1994) consider a one period model of asymmetric 
information and entry in which firms can voluntarily undergo a quality test with a 
stochastic outcome. Their model, too, does not incorporate the effects of competi-
tive interaction between the different segments. 4 Therefore, it produces a number 
of similar results, which are, however, mainly driven by the stochasticity of the 
quality test, while in this model demand side aspects are a driving force. Faulhaber 
and Yao (1989) consider a model of asymmetric information and endogenous entry 
in which consumers can become informed about quality by buying third party 
product reports. Their finding that reducing informational cost increases the num-
ber of high quality firms is somewhat related to the argument put forward in this 
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paper. However, most of their analysis takes a different angle because of the differ-
ent informational technology. Biglaiser (1993) analyzes a bargaining model under 
potential adverse selection. He shows that the presence of a middleman, which may 
be interpreted as a private auditor, mitigates adverse selection and increases wel-
fare. However, even though a condition for the entry of high quality types is de-
rived, the share of high quality suppliers is not properly endogenized. Moreover, 
the model differs in that middlemen trade themselves.  
The paper is organized as follows. The following section presents the model, 
section 3 establishes the entry equilibria and develops the comparative static re-
sults, section 4 comments on the single crossing property under entry and rational 
expected quality structure, section 5 derives some implications of labelling for the 
environment, and section 6 concludes. Some proofs are relegated to an appendix. 
2. The model 
2.1 Supply side 
In a perfectly competitive setting, a number of  M  firms produces and sells a dif-
ferentiated commodity of quality  { } θ ∈ gn , , which may be green,  g, or non-green, 
. Let the  n g( )-variant be characterized by a relatively low (high) amount of 
negative externalities (pollution) caused over its life cycle, or during any one stage 
of production, transportation, consumption, recycling or disposition, in which the 
product’s impact on the environment is particularly crucial. It should be stressed 
that while a case from environmental economics is used for illustration, the model 
extends immediately to any case of vertical differentiation into high and low qual-
ity variants. Assume that there are only single product firms in the industry, so that 
a firm’s type corresponds to its product’s type, 
n
θ , where all firms of a given type 
are identical. Assume further that each firm’s output is bound by a type specific 
capacity limit  ( ) θ q , and cost is composed of a fixed and variable component, 
where marginal cost is independent of a single firm’s scale. The presence of scale 
economies together with price taking behaviour under perfect competition then 
implies that profit maximizing firms face a binary quantity decision. A firm pro-
duces at its capacity limit,  () θ q , as long as price exceeds total average cost, evalu-
ated at  () θ q , and, otherwise, does not produce at all. Then,  
() Gq g =Γ ;  ( ) n q N Λ =    (2.1)  
give the aggregate quantity of the  g- and  -variant, respectively, which can be 
decomposed into the number of 
n
g -firms,  Γ , or   -firms,  n Λ , and the respective   6
capacity limit,  ( ) θ q . As  () q θ  is a constant, it follows from (2.1) that aggregate 
quantities,   and  G N , now serve as immediate measures of the number of produc-
ers of the respective type, which only change by entry or exit.  
G
() GN )       Cn
() ( CC :
C N




{} θ i ∈ gn i
 
A firm’s average cost  ( CG N ) θ,,  depends on its type, θ , and the aggregate 
output levels,   and N , and is identical for all firms of a given type.5 Suppose 
firms act as price takers on a number of common factor markets, where factor de-
mand and prices increase in aggregate output of the variants. As, at a given point in 
time, all firms face the same factor prices it is justified to assume average cost to be 
the same for all firms of a given type. Assume that  g -production always takes 
place at a cost disadvantage, such that  
( Cg GN GN ,, ,, , >   (2.2).6  ∀
The cost asymmetry may either be caused by an overproportionate fixed cost relat-
ing to R&D in emission reducing product or process innovations or to an invest-
ment in end-of-pipe technology; or it may be caused by an overproportionate vari-
able cost due to substitution of polluting inputs for more expensive clean inputs. 
Defining the first partial derivatives of  ( ) CG N θ,, with respect to   and  G N  by 







n :, ; , ; :, ; :, =⋅ =⋅ =⋅ =⋅ ∂∂ ∂∂ ∂∂ ∂ ,  G ∂
N ,
the properties of average cost are given by 
CC C G G
g > ∀ 00               (2.3). 
Both types’ average cost reacts positively to an increase in either type’s aggregate 
output. Via changes in the price(s) of the common factor(s) variations in industry 
output are transmitted to changes in average cost as by (2.3). For a variation in θ -
type output the impact on  -type average cost always dominates the impact on 
non-θ -type average cost, which is explained by type specific proportions in factor 
use. 
Auditing 
A firm  ‘s type  i , ,  M =12 , ,..., , is its private information which can be 
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observed neither by consumers nor by the labelling agency.7 In order to communi-
cate its type a firm may voluntarily undergo a costly eco-audit. Presume for the 
sake of modelling simplicity that the outcome of the audit is represented by a single 
(eco-)quality index  . It is assumed that the quality assessment can be 
manipulated to some degree: It is presumed that fundamental technological uncer-
tainty inhibits any clear grouping of tested products, not even implemented as a 
stochastic outcome as in Mason and Sterbenz (1994), but only allows for a general 
assessment of each individual product. This seems reasonable for the type of highly 
complex quality testing in the environmental context.8 Under such imperfect audit-
ing technology, a  -producer has some scope of concealing his true nature.9 A 
second source for manipulation lies in the presence of corrupt auditors who sell for 
a bribe – in case of agency interns - or at a market price – in case of third party 
auditors - any quality index asked for, no matter what the true type.10 Hence, both 
types may attain any quality index within the feasible range. However, usually this 
is more costly for a  -producer. He has to bear the extra cost of concealing flaws 
in eco-quality, or, in case of corrupt auditors, has to pay a risk premium included in 
the audit price or  the bribe. The premium accounts for a corrupt auditor’s risk of 
losing his reputation and future earning possibilities should the manipulation of 
reports be discovered.11 The auditing cost asymmetry gives rise to a positive, albeit 
imperfect, correlation between the quality index,  , and true type 





} a { n , g ∈ θ : any 
given index value is achieved at a lower cost by a  g-producer. Let  () Aa θ,  denote 
average auditing cost as given by total auditing cost divided by the capacity limit, 
where total auditing cost comprises any expenses the firm incurs in order to ensure 








                  








a a , A A
a , g A a , n A
0 0 ∈ ≥ ≥
>
 (2.4),  ]
                              
7 7   M Mo or re eo ov ve er r, ,   i if f    () g q ≠ , ,   a a   f fi ir rm m’ ’s s   c ca ap pa ac ci it ty y    ( ) θ i q    i is s   a al ls so o   a as ss su um me ed d   t to o   b be e   p pr ri iv va at te e   i in nf fo or rm ma at ti io on n   a as s   
o ot th he er rw wi is se e   a a   f fi ir rm m’ ’s s   t ty yp pe e   c co ou ul ld d   b be e   i in nf fe er rr re ed d   f fr ro om m   o ob bs se er rv vi in ng g   c ca ap pa ac ci it ty y. .   
8 8   T Th he e   c co om mp pl le ex x   m me et th ho od do ol lo og gy y   o of f   e ec co o- -b ba al la an nc ce es s   o or r   l li if fe e- -c cy yc cl le e- -a an na al ly ys si is s   i is s   a a   c ca as se e   a at t   h ha an nd d. .      M Mo or re eo ov ve er r, ,   t th he e   
G Ge er rm ma an n   ' 'B Bl lu ue e   A An ng ge el l' '   l la ab be el ll li in ng g   p pr ro og gr ra am mm me e, ,   f fo or r   e ex xa am mp pl le e, ,   c co on ns si is st ts s   o of f   s se ev ve er ra al l   s st ta ag ge es s   o of f   d de ev ve el lo op pi in ng g   
t th he e   r re el le ev va an nt t   p pr ro od du uc ct t   c cr ri it te er ri ia a, ,   d du ur ri in ng g   w wh hi ic ch h   t th he e   a ag ge en nc cy y   r re el li ie es s   h he ea av vi il ly y   o on n   o ou ut ts si id de e   i in nf fo or rm ma at ti io on n   e ev ve en n   
f fr ro om m   f fi ir rm ms s   t th he em ms se el lv ve es s   ( (O OE EC CD D   1 19 99 91 1) ). .   
9 9   E En nv vi ir ro on nm me en nt ta al ll ly y   h ha ar rm mf fu ul l   c ch ha ar ra ac ct te er ri is st ti ic cs s   o of f   a a   p pr ro od du uc ct t   m ma ay y   b be e   c co ov ve er re ed d   u up p   b by y   t te em mp po or ra ar ry y   i im mp pr ro ov ve e- -
m me en nt t   o of f   t th he e   p pr ro od du uc ct t’ ’s s   e en nv vi ir ro on nm me en nt ta al l   f fe ea at tu ur re es s, ,   f fo or r   e ex xa am mp pl le e   b by y   m ma an ni ip pu ul la at ti io on n   o of f   s sa am mp pl le es s   o or r   p pr ro oc ce es s- -
s se es s    u up po on n    t th he e   p po oi in nt t   o of f   i in ns sp pe ec ct ti io on n, ,   a an nd d   t th he e   d di iv ve er rs si io on n   o of f   t th he e   a au ud di it to or rs s’ ’   a at tt te en nt ti io on n   t to o   d di im me en ns si io on ns s   i in n   
w wh hi ic ch h   t th he e   p pr ro od du uc ct t   p pe er rf fo or rm ms s   r re el la at ti iv ve el ly y   w we el ll l. .   
1 10 0   M Ma an ny y   l la ab be el ll li in ng g   p pr ro og gr ra am mm me es s   d de el le eg ga at te e   a au ud di it ti in ng g   t to o   t th hi ir rd d   p pa ar rt ty y   e ex xp pe er rt ts s. .   M Mo or re eo ov ve er r, ,   e ev ve en n   p pr ro og gr ra am m- -
m me es s   w wi it th h   i in ns si id de e   e ev va al lu ua at ti io on n, ,   e e. .g g. .   t th he e   ' 'B Bl lu ue e   A An ng ge el l' '   p pr ro og gr ra am mm me e, ,   u us su ua al ll ly y   r re el ly y   o on n   o ou ut ts si id de e   e ex xp pe er rt ti is se e. .   
W Wi id de es sp pr re ea ad d   a an ne ec cd do ot ta al l   e ev vi id de en nc ce e   h ha as s   i it t   t th ha at t   a al ll l   f fi ir rm ms s, ,    g    a an nd d    n , ,   p pr ro od du uc ce e   c cu us st to om m   t ta ai il lo or re ed d   e ex xp pe er rt t   r re e- -
p po or rt ts s   t to o   c co on nf fi ir rm m   t th he ei ir r   c cl la ai im m   o of f   b be ei in ng g   e en nv vi ir ro on nm me en nt ta al ll ly y   f fr ri ie en nd dl ly y   o on n   a a   ' 's sc ci ie en nt ti if fi ic ca al ll ly y   s so ou un nd d' '   b ba as si is s. .   
1 11 1   F Fo or r   a a   m mo od de el l   i in n   w wh hi ic ch h   t th he e   r re ep pu ut ta at ti io on n   o of f   m mi id dd dl le em me en n   i is s   e ex xp pl li ic ci it tl ly y   c co on ns si id de er re ed d   s se ee e   B Bi ig gl la ai is se er r   ( (1 19 99 93 3) ). .     8
where  ( ) AA n a a
n:, = ∂∂ a  and  ( ) AA g a a
g:, = ∂ a ∂  denote the first partial derivatives. 
Average auditing cost and its marginal change in the index value are always non-
negative for both types, while average auditing cost is strictly greater, and the mar-
ginal change is weakly greater for the n- as opposed to the  g-type. Notice that for 
 a  () () g q n q >> g-type may have disadvantage in average auditing cost even when 
having a strict advantage in total auditing cost. As will be established in Proposi-
tion 3.2,  g-entry occurs only for a  g-type’s strict advantage in average auditing 
cost. For being trivial, the case of  g-type’s disadvantage in average auditing cost 
is therefore not pursued any further. Dropping the attribute ‘average’  for conven-
ience,  ( a , A ) θ  and   are henceforth labelled ‘auditing cost’  and ‘marginal audit-




a A g-firm if 
due to auditing imperfection it has to increase efforts to attain a higher index value. 
Outside experts are likely to include the additional cost of assessing a higher qual-
ity index by use of more sophisticated audit procedures in the price charged for an 
audit. As a firm wishing to attain a zero index value does not undergo the audit for 
not having to bear the (potential) fixed cost let  ( ) ( ) g ,, 00 An A 0 = = . 
2.2 The consumer’s problem and market clearing 
Consider a representative consumer who maximizes utility by choosing quantities 
of the differentiated commodity and an outside composite good subject to his 
budget constraint and for a given set of prices. While the consumer is completely 
informed with regard to the composite good he cannot observe the true quality of 
the differentiated product. However, the consumer forms rational expectations 
about average quality as follows. 
Beliefs 
The label divides the market into two segments,  jl u = , , where   ( j = lj u = ) re-
lates to the segment with (without) label. Let us introduce as a convention that the 
term 'separation' refers to type, i.e. green ( g) or non-green ( ), whereas 
'segmentation' relates to the division of the market by the label. The label is 
associated with a quality index a , which has been set by the labelling agency as 
a minimum requirement for awarding the label. Observing a , aggregate supply 
, and the aggregate number of firms   in the two segments  , the 







M jl u = ,




u prob ga Q M Q M j l u == =
min,,,, ; ,       )   (2.5). 
This is the probability that the consumer places on drawing a unit of the  g-variant   9
from segment  j  conditional upon the observation of the minimum requirement, 
supply and number of firms in the two segments. As beliefs are required to be ra-
tional, the subjective probability σ j must coincide with the actual share of the  g-
variant in aggregate supply,  , such that  Qj
S
j
S =⇔ jj N =
S Q ;










σσ jj j GQ jl u − = 1      , , (2.6). 
Assume that type specific capacities  ( ) ( ) qg qn ≠  are common knowledge.12 Then, 
at any state of the system, equilibrium and out of equilibrium, the consumer can 
calculate average quality with reference to the observation of   and   only.13 
Notice that in this case the label supplies information about segmentation only; the 
particular value   does not transmit any additional information. Moreover, 
the consumer does not require further information, for example with regard to cost 





The consumer’s problem 
Let the representative consumer’s utility be given by 
( ) ( N G G v U
D D D + =  (2.7), 
where  G
D and N
D  are expected consumption levels of the  g- and  - variant, 
respectively, and   is consumption of the outside composite. Utility is additive in 
sub-utility   from 'pure' consumption and an extra private benefit   from con-




( ⋅ w v ⋅
-variant. The extra benefit may come along with a higher overall 
quality of the  -variant, a warm glow feeling from well-behaving, or social re-
wards. The effect on aggregate pollution is not taken into account as the consumer 
does not expect to influence it by his individual choice.14 Let  the first and second 
partial derivatives of   be given by    and    
, respectively. Marginal utility of 'pure' consumption of 
the differentiated good,  , is independent of which variant is consumed. Let the 
first and second derivatives of 
0 1, > m w w
0 1 11 > m w w , w
1 w
  0; = < mm
v  be   and  0 > ' v 0 < ' ' v , respectively, such that 
consumption of an additional unit of the  g-variant increases the extra benefit but 
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only at a decreasing rate.15 
The representative consumer maximizes (2.7) by choosing quantities Q  of 
the differentiated good from the segments 
j
D
jl u = ,  and a quantity   of the outside 






















and the budget constraint 
Imp Q p Q ll
D
uu
D =+ +  (2.8b). 
Thereby,   denotes price in segment  pj jl u = , , which the consumer takes as given, 
and  I  denotes exogenous income. The composite is used as númeraire, its price 
being normalized to one. Notice that the consumer maximizes utility over expected 
values of quantities, which implies risk neutrality.16 The second order condition is 
satisfied if  . The first order conditions then give  1 1 11 m m mm w w w ≥ w
pp j l jj =+ =u σ ϖ;      ,  (2.9), 
where 
m w w : p 1 =  (2.10)  m w ' v := ϖ  (2.11). 
Expression (2.10) gives the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between differen-
tiated and outside commodity with regard to pure consumption, and (2.11) the 
MRS between the  g-variant and the outside commodity with regard to the extra 
benefit from  g-consumption. 
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Market Clearing prices 
Both market segments are cleared if the two conditions 




jj ,,,, ; , σσ ==+ =       u  (2.12) 
are satisfied, where   are the direct (segment) demand functions following 





j . Market clearing prices are then given by 
() ()( ) ( ) p G N GN pGN G N GN j lu jjj jjj ,, , , , ,; , =+ = σϖ         (2.13), 
where   and  GGG l =+ u u NNN l = + .17 The (implicit) functions   and  ( pGN , )
() ϖ GN , , together with a function  ( ) N , G m , follow as solutions from the system 
given by (2.10),  (2.11) and the transformed budget constraint  
() Imp GN G =+ + +ϖ  (2.14).18 
Thus, the price in each segment  j  consists of baseline price  ( ) p ⋅ , capturing the 
MRS with regard to pure consumption, and a premium  ( ) ϖ ⋅ , capturing the MRS 
with regard to the  g-benefit. The premium is weighted by the expected share of 
g-supply within the segment, σ j. Comparative statics of the system (2.10), (2.11) 
















It is easily shown that only  
pN < 0 (2.15b) 
is unambiguously determined. This follows from the interaction of the following 
effects on baseline price,  p, and premium, ϖ , as caused by changes in supply. An 
increase in supply of any one variant of the differentiated good has a direct nega-
tive effect on  p and ϖ . First, baseline price and premium must fall in order to 
adjust to the lower equilibrium MRS between the differentiated and outside good 
with regard to pure consumption and extra benefit. Second,  p and ϖ  must fall in 
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order to increase the consumer’s effective budget for purchase of the additional 
supply. Additionally, an indirect effect arises from  adjustment of the relation be-
tween  p and ϖ  to changes in the implicit MRS,  1 w ' v , between the g -variant as 
source of the extra benefit and any one variant of the differentiated good as source 
of utility from pure consumption.19 Consider an increase in expected supply  .20 
Marginal utility from baseline consumption is unambiguously reduced, while the 
marginal benefit from 
N
g -consumption remains constant. This tends to lower base-
line price and increase the premium. Considering both, direct and indirect, effects, 
an increase in   unambiguously reduces  N p, as by (2.15b), whereas the impact on 
ϖ  is ambiguous. For an increase in expected supply G  the indirect effect is am-
biguous as both marginal utility from baseline consumption and the marginal bene-
fit from g -consumption decrease. The ambiguity carries over to the aggregate ef-


































:==2 0 (2.16), 
which capture the impact of  changes in supply of either variant on expectations for 
each particular segment. 
2.3 Sequence of events and equilibrium concept 
Consider the following sequence of events. 
Outset: An exogenous innovation has rendered production with the  -technology 
feasible. The new set of technologies { , g  is common knowledge to all potential 
firms, the agency in charge of labelling, and the representative consumer. 
Stage 1: The agency specifies a level of the quality index  [ a  to be pro-
duced by any firm wishing to qualify for the label. 
min m , ∈ 0
Stage 2: The market is opened and potential firms simultaneously choose amongst 
the following alternatives: enter as a  g-producer, enter as a  -producers, or do not 
enter. Ex-post switching of technologies, which may give rise to moral hazard, is 
not possible. The firms’ choices are guided by profit maximization, where a firm 
enters with a capacity 
n
() { } ; i i n , g q ∈ θ θ  ;  =12 , ,...,  only if it expects a non-
negative profit. 
                                                 
1 19 9   T Th he e   i im mp pl li ic ci it t   M MR RS S   f fo ol ll lo ow ws s   i im mm me ed di ia at te el ly y   f fr ro om m   d di iv vi is si io on n   o of f   ( (2 2. .1 11 1) )   b by y   ( (2 2. .1 10 0) ). .   
2 20 0   T Th he e   c co on ns su um me er r   r ra at ti io on na al ll ly y   a an nt ti ic ci ip pa at te es s   t th he e   i in nc cr re ea as se e   i in n   a ag gg gr re eg ga at te e   s su up pp pl ly y   o of f   e ei it th he er r      v va ar ri ia an nt t. .   T Th he er re ef fo or re e      
t th he e   e ef ff fe ec ct ts s   o on n   b ba as se el li in ne e   p pr ri ic ce e   a an nd d   p pr re em mi iu um m   a ar re e   g gi iv ve en n   i in nd de ep pe en nd de en nt tl ly y   o of f   t th he e   c ch ha an ng ge es s   i in n   t th he e   c co on ns su u- -
m me er r’ ’s s   e ex xp pe ec ct ta at ti io on ns s   w wi it th h   r re eg ga ar rd d   t to o   t th he e   s sh ha ar re e   o of f    g - -s su up pp pl ly y   w wi it th hi in n   e ea ac ch h   s se eg gm me en nt t. .     13
Stage 3: Each entering firm chooses a quality index  [ ] aa i ∈ 0,
max ,  i M =12 , ,...,  to 
be delivered to the agency and sinks the auditing cost  ( ) Aa i θ, . It is assumed that 
for institutional reasons or for reasons of credibility the products’ eco-quality can 
only be communicated to the consumer by the centralized label, so that individual 
firm labels are excluded from analysis. As the label is granted to any firm transmit-
ting  , profit maximization implies choice of an index value  . 




aa ul == 0;
{} aa i ∈ 0,
min
jl u = ,
a
min
Stage 4: The representative consumer, being uninformed about θ i observes the 
market data, updates his beliefs according to (2.5) and (2.6), and expresses demand 
as given by Q  in (2.12). The two market clearing prices are given by (2.13), 
where all actors are price takers. 
j
D
An entry equilibrium is given by a market structure { } GN jl u jj *, * ; ,       = , 
where  ,  GN jj *, * ≥ 0 NNN ul ** + * =  and GG ul ** G * + = , which satisfies the 
following set of conditions for θ -type entrants’ profit. 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) πθ θ θ
θ
, , *, *, *, * , , ;
,; ,; ;
min
aG N GN p C A a
jl u g n a a a
jj j j j
ul
=⋅ − ⋅ − ≤
== = =
0
0              
 (2.17). 
The four conditions in (2.17) require that for a further producer of either type entry 
be strictly profitable in neither of the segments. Notice that 
() π θ,j < 0: θ =⇔ = gG j* 0 and θ = ⇔ = nN j* 0 (2.18). 
It is assumed that the number of potential producers of either type is sufficiently 
large so as not to restrict entry from above.21 Firms act strictly competitively not 
only with regard to prices but also with regard to the index value,  , such that 
there is no strategic behaviour. Hence, the entry equilibrium as by (2.17) consti-
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3. Entry equilibria 
Analyis of the entry equilibria proceeds by the following steps. First, a set of nec-
essary and sufficient conditions for  g-entry is established. Then, from the condi-
tions in (2.17) equilibrium quantities { } GN jl u jj *, * ; ,   =
a
min
 are determined. Finally, 
by use of comparative statics the influence of   on market, i.e. quality, structure 
is derived. 
According to (2.17) entry occurs until  
() ( ) ( ) ( ) {} p CgG N Aga CnG N Ana G N jj j =+ + min , *, * , ; , *, * , *, *      ∀   (3.1) 
From this follows immediately 
Proposition 3.1 If  -producers have a cost advantage in unit production cost as by 
(2.2) 
n
g-firms never enter the market without a  label.  
Proof: See Appendix. 
Corollary 3.1 The price in the  -segment is always given by  u
()() () ( ) p pGN N GN pGN uu u =+ = ,, , σϖ 0 ,  for  .  Nu > 0
Proof: Immediate from (2.6) and (2.14) for Gu* = 0. 
In the absence of an eco-label the threat of adverse selection inhibits the introduc-
tion of the  g-variant if its production takes place at a cost disadvantage. As a 
benchmark assume that in the absence of a label, such that GG ,  -
producers can profitably supply a quantity 
u ** == 0
N u **
n
NN = => 0 0. As 
GG ul ** ≡⇔ G * ≡ 0  and σ u ≡ 0 the indices  jl u = ,  on 'G ' and 'σ '  are dropped 
henceforth. Moreover, as NN u N ** l * ≡ −  the triple { } N l * GN *, *,  can be used as 
conventional notation for market structure. The benchmark structure is then given 
by {} .   00 0 ,, N
Suppose now that a label is introduced. Define  
[ ] () ( ) ( ) ( ) { } a , n A N , , n C a , g A N , , g C a , a max : a
max + ≥ + ∈ = 0 0 0 0   0    (3.2) 
and  


















* N *, G , g C
* N *, G * N *, G * N *, G p
max a , g A a , a max : a
l max ϖ σ
  0 (3.3). 
Then, the following proposition applies.   15
Proposition 3.2 Let production and auditing cost be characterized by (2.2) and 
(2.4), respectively. Then,  g-firms enter the market with a label if and only if 
]] a , a a
nin ∈ . 
Proof: See Appendix. 
The label induces  g-entry if and only if the qualification level,  , meets the 






g-type’s advantage in auditing cost at the least offset the disadvantage in 
production cost. On the other han a
min must be bounded from above. Only then, 
auditing cost does not exceed maximum gross profit attainable by a 
d, 
g-firm in 
equilibrium, as by (3.3), so that the payoff to entry is non-negative. If the label fails 
to generat   e g-entry, this is anticipated by the consumer who is not willing to pay a 
surcharge on the labelled products then. Thus,  -producers do not have an incen-
tive to attain a costly label and market structure is given by the benchmark   
. 
n
{} 00 , 0 , N
Assuming that the necessary and sufficient conditions for  g-entry are met, a 
set of entry equilibrium conditions can be derived from (2.17) for each of the fol-
lowing three cases: (1) {} 0 > ∧ > ⇔ * N * N * N * N *, N *, G u l l
u
 (pooled supply in l -




(pooled supply in l -segment and no supply in  -segment), and (3) 
 (separation:  {} GN N *, *, * 0 ⇔= N u g-supply in l - and  - or no supply in 
-segment). Consider these regimes in turn. 
n
u
Regime 1: { GNN l *, *, *}  Pooled supply in l-segment and n-supply in u-segment 
This equilibrium is characterized by the set of conditions 
() () () ( ) ( ) pG N G N G N CgG N Aga l *, * *, * *, * , *, * ,
min +− = σϖ  (3.4a), 
() ( ) pG N CnG N *, * , *, * − 0 =  (3.4b), 
() ( ) ( σϖ GN GN A n a l *, * *, * ,
min = )  (3.4c). 
Equations (3.4a) and (3.4b) are zero-profit conditions for entry by  g-firms into 
the  -segment and by  -firms into the  -segment, respectively, while (3.4c) is a 
no-arbitrage condition requiring that a  -firm attains the same (zero) profit in the 
- and  -segment. In the following, the integer problem is ignored and G ,   and 
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G G  (3.5), 
where the derivatives are given as in (2.15a), (2.15b) and (2.16). If the Routh-
Hurwitz-conditions 




N N L N C p p C J  (3.6), 
[] 0 > + + − = ϖ σ β α N trJ ,  ( ) [ ] 0 > + + − + − J J β ϖ σ γδ αβ
g
G G N C p tr , 
are satisfied, then the triple   gives a unique and stable solution of 
(3.4a)-(3.4c)., where   denotes the Jacobian of the system.22 Application of the 
implicit function theorem then gives  
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0 0, (3.9), 
where  J < 0 by (3.6), σ ϖ N < 0 by (2.16), and the variables in Greek notation as 
by (3.5).  
Proposition 3.3 Consider the interior equilibrium { } GNN l *, *, * . A small increase 
in the qualification level,  , (i) increases a
min g- supply,  , if and only if the  G* g-
type has a strict advantage in marginal audit cost,  ; and (ii) reduces  -
supply with a label,  , if and only if the equilibrium  reactions of aggregate 
supplies   and   causes a net increase in the expectations weighted premium 









g-type’s profit decreases under the equilibrium  reactions of G  and  .  * * N
Proof: See Appendix. 
                                                 
2 22 2   C Co on ns st ta an nt t   a ad dj ju us st tm me en nt t   v ve el lo oc ci it ty y   e eq qu ua al l   t to o   o on ne e   i is s   a as ss su um me ed d   f fo or r   a al ll l   v va ar ri ia ab bl le es s. .     17
The intuition behind part (i) of the proposition is the following. After an increase in 
 the EWP,  a
min σϖ , must increase by the  -type’s marginal auditing cost in order 
to restore the no-arbitrage condition (3.4c). Then, for a strict advantage in marginal 
audit cost, 
n
g-types’ profit increases in a  and gives rise to 
min g-entry. According 
to part (ii) of the proposition a tightening of a  reduces labelled  -supply if the 
equilibrium adjustments of aggregate quantities G  and   either have a nega-
tive net impact on the EWP and thus on  -firms’ additional revenue from entering 
the  -segment, or if the positive net impact on the EWP is too low as to offset  -
firms’ marginal auditing cost. The impact of the adjustments in   and   on the 
EWP is composed of the following effects. As by (2.16), there is a positive direct 





* G * N
g-entry raises consumer’s expectations over quality. Accord-
ing to (2.15a) the impact on the premium itself is ambiguous for both, changes in 
 and  . In particular, the EWP may sink for an increase in   if  G N G g-
consumption is satiated such that additional supply can only be sold at a substantial 
reduction in the premium which more than offsets consumers’ expectations for a 
higher average quality. Satisfaction of the sufficient condition given in part (iii) of 
the proposition guarantees that the EWP cannot increase by more than  -type’s 
auditing cost, so that  -firms’ incentives to enter the l -segment are unambigu-
ously reduced. However, if the increase in the EWP more than offsets the  -type’s 
marginal audit cost, the positive net-revenue from entering the l -segment serves as 






g-type’s advantage in marginal audit cost,  . This is because the 












dG dN da l *
min < da
mi *
n  cannot be excluded and the degree of pool-
ing, as measured by the ratio NG l ** , may, thus, increase in  .23  a
min
Proposition 3.4 Given { , a small increase in the qualification level, 
, decreases aggregate  -supply, 
} GNN l *, *, *
n a
min N* , if and only if the  g-type has a strict 
advantage in marginal auditing cost and  g-entry strictly reduces profit in the  -
segment. 
u
Proof: Immediate from (3.9), where  ( ) δ∂ π =−= pC n u GG
n , ∂ G .  
Intuitively, one would expect a relative increase in the supply of the  g-variant to 
tighten (expected) competitive pressure on n-firms in the market and thus reduce 
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n-entry. However, there is a potential for a perverse effect, by which  -supply 
increases in  . The impact of 
n
a
min g-entry on  - profit in the  -segment and, by the 
no-arbitrage condition, in the l -segment is ambiguous. While 
n u
g-entry always 
raises the cost of  -production, the impact on baseline price,  n p, is ambiguous, as 
by (2.15a). If preferences for the  g-variant are weak or if the share of  g-
consumers is small, the additional supply of the  g-variant can trigger a reduction 
in the premium, ϖ , so strong that the purchasing power released allows to raise  p. 




N* . This finding corresponds to the result by Mattoo and Singh (1994), who 
find that if before labelling  g-supply exceeds  g-demand, introduction of the label 
may raise the price of the  -variant by so much that its supply increases. However, 
besides disregarding the cost side they derive this result from a more rudimentary 
model not tracing it back to preferences. Other sources for this perverse effect have 
been identified. Dosi and Moretto (1998) show for a multi-product firm that ex-
pected attainment of a label for a 
n
g-product line may increase investment into a 
-product line if an image spill-over raises returns to  -capital. Moraga-González 
and Padrón-Fumero (1997) show for a vertically differentiated duopoly that if vari-
ants become closer substitutes by virtue of a minimum standard then competition 
increases and price falls so that  -demand may expand. 
n n
n
{} GN *, *,
() * ) pG Cn N*
u*
<
= NN l *
u
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Regime 2:    N * Pooled supply in l-segment and no supply in u-segment 
In this regime baseline price has been reduced by so much that  
( N G *, , *, − 0  
and by virtue of (2.18)  . Consequently,  N 0 * = . In this case of a break-
ing down of the  -segment, the equilibrium is characterized by the conditions 
( N N G C *, *, * ,  (3.4a'), 
( ) N N G Cn *, *, *  (3.4c'), 
which are zero-profit conditions for  - and n-firms, respectively. Define 
ϖ σ ϖ η + > − + N G G p  (3.10), 
where the partial derivatives are defined by (2.15a), (2.15b) and (2.16). Then, the 
quantities{  form a unique and stable equilibrium of (3.4a') and (3.4c') if 
the system’s Jacobian,   satisfies 
} GN *, *
J'
trJ' =+< α κ 0 (3.11a),   19
() J' =− + > ακ η σ ϖ γ N 0 (3.11b) 
where the variables are defined in (3.5) and (3.10). Comparative statics of the sys-
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where  J' > 0 by (3.11b), σ ϖ N < 0 by (2.16) and the variables in Greek notation 
as by (3.5) and (3.10). 
Proposition 3.5 Consider the interior equilibrium { } GNN *, *, * . A small increase 
in  the qualification level, a , (i) increases 
min g-supply,  , if and only if the equi-
librium reaction of 
G*
N*  bears a net impact on  g-profit, which exceeds (falls short 
of)  g-type’s marginal audit cost for the case that  g-profit decreases (increases) in 
; and (ii) reduces  -supply,  G n N* , if and only if the equilibrium reaction of   
bears a net impact on  -profit, which falls short of (exceeds)  -type’s marginal 
audit cost for the case that   -profit decreases (increases) in  . (iii) It is neces-




g-profit decreases in   and sufficient for part (ii) that  N g-
profit decreases in  .  G
Proof: See Appendix. 
According to part (iii) of the proposition a tightening of a  has a negative impact 
on 
min
g-supply if  g-profit increases in  -supply. Albeit being not very likely, this 
may occur if additional  -supply lowers baseline price by so much that the pur-
chasing power released allows for an overproportionate increase in the premium. If 




falls likewise. Still a label is necessary to put a restriction on  -entry as otherwise 
the consumers’ expectation of a 
n
g-purchase, σ , would drop to zero and so would 
the EWP. With regard to the qualification level   there exists a trade-off be-




type on the one hand, and the absolute auditing cost imposed on the  g-type on the 
other hand. A tighter   reduces  a
min g-supply if the increase in net profit due to cur-
tailed pooling falls short of the increase in auditing cost. The trade-off does not 
exist under regime 1, where a  -producer has an option to produce in the  - or  -
segment. Baseline price and production cost being equal in both segments, a  -
firm’s selection of the segment is based only on the EWP vis-à-vis the audit cost. 





least equal to  -type’s marginal audit cost. No effects on baseline price or produc-
tion cost arise from  -types’ decision to attain a label, which does not effect ag-
gregate  -supply. Hence, for the advantage in marginal audit cost, 
n
n
n g-profit never 
declines. As the  -producer may only enter the market with a label under regime 
2, switches in   affect aggregate  -supply and thus baseline price and produc-
tion cost. The offsetting effects become more complex, as characterized in part (i) 
of the proposition and give rise to the trade-off. By part (ii) and (iii) of the proposi-
tion a tightening of a  entails a perverse  increase in  -entry into the  -segment 
under the same conditions as discussed for part (ii) of proposition 3.3. Again, it is 






g-supply and increase in  -supply is precluded by stability.25   n
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Regime 3: 0  Separation; g-supply in l-segment and n- or no supply in u-
segment 
In this regime the  -type’s auditing cost is so high that 
( ) ( ( p C n A n a min , * , ,
mi 00 +−  
such that no  -firm has an incentive to attain a label and Nl* = 0. the label fully 
separates the types. As  () σ G*,0 =  the price in the  -segment reflects the con-
sumer’s full (marginal) willingness to pay for the  -variant. The equilibrium is 
characterized by the conditions 
) ( ) ( pG N CgG Ag ,* , ,* +− =  (3.4a''), 
) pG N N* 0 (3.4b'') 
The equilibrium quantities  follow as a unique solution from (3.4a'') and 
(3.4b''), where 
{ GN *, *
 if (3.4b'') holds as strict inequality. For N*  the system 
is stable if and only if for the Jacobian    ''
J'' αβ   trJ < β 0 
where the variables are defined as in (3.5). Then, 
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where  0 > ' ' J  and the variables in Greek letters as given in (3.5). 
Proposition 3.6 Given the equilibrium { } GN *, *,0 , i.e. full separation, a small in-
crease in the qualification level,  , (i) decreases  a
min g-supply; and  (ii), given that 




Proof: Immediate form (3.15) and (3.16), where  .  δ =− pC GG
n
Once separation is achieved a further increase in the qualification level solely in-
creases the  g-producers’ cost of attaining the label and thus reduces entry. The 
reaction of  -producers is ambiguous for the reasons discussed above.  n
A caveat to the above findings is that they are derived from comparative static 
analysis. Therefore, the Routh-Hurwicz-Theorem applies to local stability and thus 
within a neighbourhood of {  only. With no market being existent at 
the outset, existence of a stable trajectory from a 'non-market' structure   to 
 has thus to be assumed.  
}
}
GNN l *, *, *
{} 000 ,,
{ GNN l *, *, *
From a modelling as well as from a policy point of view it would be conven-
ient if the implicit functions  ( ) Ga *
min ,  ( ) N* ⋅  and  ( ) Nl* ⋅  could be fully devel-
oped along the interval ] a , a ] . However, for three reasons this is not possible with-
out placing a number of restrictions on the model. First, equilibrium reactions of 
quantities, as given by (3.7)-(3.9), and (3.12)-(3.15), respectively, are functions of 
the equilibrium quantities themselves. Hence, changes in equilibrium quantities 
feed back on their respective reactivity altering their impact and possibly sign. 
Second, even though it can be shown that the separation regime 3, if existent, al-
ways lies in an interval [ ] a , a
sep , it is not clear whether regime 1 or 2 obtains at the 
lower bound a. This is because the implicit functions are not continuous at a. Fi-
nally, the implicit functions are differentiable within each single regime but not 
necessarily at the boundaries. Hence, the existence of any single one regime is not 
guaranteed and the ordering of the pooling regimes, if both exist, is ambiguous. In   22
principle, a set of existence conditions for the various regimes could be established. 
Employing additionally a number of conditions to restrict the signs of the reactivi-
ties in subsequent regimes, one could derive a number of sequences of regimes 
contingent on the characteristics of the inverse demand and cost functions. The aim 
of the paper, being a more general identification of the mechanisms behind label-
ling, however, does not warrant derivation of more specific results upon a multi-
tude of additional structure. 
4. Relation to the Single Crossing Property 
From a theoretical point of view it is interesting to relate the above results to the 
Single-crossing-property (SCP) or Spence-Mirrlees-condition which is a necessary 
condition for attainment of a separating equilibrium in most screening and signal-
ling models. Essentially, it requires the net gain from an increase in the signal level 
to be greater for the  - vis-à-vis the  -type (e.g. Gibbons 1992; Kreps and Sobel 
1994). For regime 1 this can be expressed as  
h l
()









N min min min
da
















l , g d
π π
ϖ σ σϖ ε
ϖ σ γ α
π
−
= − + + ≥
− + + =
. 
Substituting  () ( ) ( )( )
min min min da dG da dG dG dN da dN β δ − = = , as following 




























m i nm i n m i nm i n −  (4.1). 
The variables are given by (2.16), (3.5) and (3.10). Consider a small change in 
. Adjustment in expected supply then occurs until  a
min ( ) 0 =
min da l , d θ π  for both 
types  n , g = θ .26 This follows immediately from the notion of zero-profit equilib-
rium and is checked by inserting the equilibrium reactivities (3.7) and (3.8) into 
(4.1). Each side of (4.1) individually adds up to zero then. Obviously, the SCP does 
not only depend on marginal auditing cost but crucially hinges on the effects of 
changes in supply on price and average production cost. It is easily shown that 
(4.1) holds as a strict inequality for 
min min da * dG da dG <  so that the SCP is 
                                                 
2 26 6    A As s    t th he e    c co om mp pa ar ra at ti iv ve e    s st ta at ti ic c    a ar rg gu um me en nt t    r re ef fe er rs s    t to o   a an n   e ex x- -a an nt te e   e en nt tr ry y   s si it tu ua at ti io on n, ,   r re ef fe er re en nc ce e   i is s   p pr ro op pe er rl ly y   
m ma ad de e   t to o   c ch ha an ng ge es s   i in n   e ex xp pe ec ct te ed d   s su up pp pl ly y   f fo or r   d di if ff fe er re en nt t   v va al lu ue es s    a
min . .   F Fo or r   i in ns st ta an nc ce e, ,    dN da l
min < 0    d do oe es s   
n no ot t   i im mp pl ly y   t th ha at t    n - -s su up pp pl ly y   i is s   r re ed du uc ce ed d   b by y   e ex xi it t   f fr ro om m   t th he e   l - -s se eg gm me en nt t   b bu ut t   r ra at th he er r   t th ha at t   e ex xp pe ec ct te ed d   e en nt tr ry y   i in n- -
t to o   t th he e    l - -s se eg gm me en nt t   i is s   r re ed du uc ce ed d   r re el la at ti iv ve e   t to o   a a   l lo ow we er r   l le ev ve el l   o of f   a
min . .     23
strictly satisfied along the adjustment path.27 However, under stability the changes 
in supply work towards an equilibration of (4.1), This is easily seen for 
() ( ) 0 >
min da dG dt d  under observation of (3.6). The (relative) increase in g -
supply always weakens the g -type’s advantage in net profitability and, thereby, 
the SCP until in equilibrium, for 
min min da * dG da dG =
n
, (4.1) holds as an equality 






The influence of quantity effects on the  -type’s incentives to pool by attain-
ing a label are best illustrated by the following counterintuitive examples. First, 




a A A =
0 =
min da * dG  and  0 <
min
l * dN . According to (4.1),  0 >
min da dG  contra-
dicts the SCP and can be no stable reaction. Suppose now  0 ≤
min da dG  and con-
sider the change of profitability for the n-type as given by the RHS in (4.1). The 
increase of   bears a negative impact on profit which can only be offset by an 
increase in the EWP, 
a
min
σϖ . For  0 ≤ da dG
min  this only is achieved by a reduction 
in supply  . Hence, no matter what the reaction of  l N g -producers, 
min da l dN . 
This fully restores the g -firms’ profitability so that  0 =
min da dG . Even though 
the SCP (weakly) fails the degree of pooling is reduced. The underlying rationale is 
that attainment of the label by a  -type not only requires the SCP to fail, such that 
entering the l-segment is relatively profitable vis-à-vis the 
n
g -type, but also re-
quires pooling to be profitable in absolute terms. However, under rational expecta-
tions the EWP and thus the return to pooling are reduced with the degree of pool-
ing. This puts an upper ceiling on the incentive to pool and, thereby, mitigates the 
problem of adverse selection even under failure of the SCP. 




a A A 0 < −γδ αβ . As easily verified from (4.1) the 
SCP is satisfied for 
min da * dG dG < . Nonetheless, according to (3.8), 
0 >
min
l da * dN . Observation of the LHS of (4.1) shows that  0 >
min da dG  in-
creases  g -profit, an inherently unstable tendency. However, if ongoing g -entry 
increases the EWP by so much that n-type’s marginal auditing cost is more than 
offset and the (absolute) return to attaining a label becomes positive the number of 
-firms, which enter the  l-segment, increases. The two examples render obvious 
a shortcoming of the 'traditional' SCP in models with rational expectations and en-
dogenous market structure. By its very nature the SCP only addresses relative prof-
n
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itability between the two types. This is sufficient for all models in which profitabil-
ity only depends on the value of the signal, while for a given signal profitability is 
either independent of market (and quality) structure, or market structure itself is 
fixed. However, under rational expectations absolute profitability depends on mar-
ket structure. Then, the SCP’s failure to incorporate the effects of absolute profit-
ability on the n-type’s incentives to pool leads to misdiagnose. Whereas the first 
example has shown that the SCP is not a necessary condition for market separation, 
the second has shown that it is not a sufficient condition either. Analysis for regime 





Proposition 4.1 In models of rational expectations and endogenous market struc-
ture absolute profitability of entering the high quality (here:  -) segment becomes 
endogenous with regard to market structure. For 
l
] a , a
nin ∈ ] a , the SCP is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for market separation. It, therefore, needs to be amended 
for the effects of changing market structure on absolute profitability. 
A caveat to the above findings is that our findings only apply to a comparison of 
different market structures involving g -entry. However, unless the g -type´s ad-
vantage in average auditing cost is so great that 
+ → 0 a  a label generates g -entry 
only if   over a sufficient part of the interval  0 > −
n
a A ] 0,a] . As for all 
[] , a





]] 0,a  and must hold consequently. 
5. Environmental impact 
The ultimate objective of an eco-labelling scheme lies not that much in the creation 
of a green market but rather in the reduction of pollution. Thus at least brief refer-
ence should be paid to this point. Consider 
() 0 0 ≥ ≥ > m G N E ; E m , N , G E  (5.1), 
giving the aggregate emission level as a non-decreasing function in the quantities 
,  G N  and  .The first partial derivatives with respect to the quantities  m
m , N , G ; Q Q E EQ = = ∂ ∂  can be interpreted as unit emissions. Then, 
 reflects the assumption that the  0 ≥ G > E N E g-variant is associated with a lower 
degree of lifetime externalities than the  -variant. Totally differentiating (5.1) with 















+ + =  (5.2).   25
 Total differentiation of the budget constraint in equilibrium 
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give the impact of marginal changes in   and  G N  on   and   m






l + + ⋅ = ζ  
gives the impact on   of the change in aggregate auditing cost. According to (5.2) 
and (5.3) the impact on aggregate emissions of a marginal change in the qualifica-
tion level is not only determined by the change in quantities of the 
m
g- and  -
variant, respectively, but also by the change in consumption of the composite,  .28 




g- and  -variant are reflected in opposing changes in outside consumption  . 
Notice that the  impact of quantity changes on production and auditing cost as 
transmitted by price changes is accounted for. Inserting (5.3) into (5.2) and rear-
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The impact of a change in the qualification level can, thus, be hypothetically sepa-
rated into three distinct effects. The term on the RHS of the first line of (5.5) gives 
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a market size effect. It captures the impact on aggregate emissions of changes in 
aggregate quantity of the differentiated good evaluated at the net emission impact 
of the  -variant. The induced change in outside consumption is included as an 
offsetting effect to marginal emissions from the  -variant. The first term in the 




evaluated at the differential net emission impact of the  g-vis-à-vis the  -variant. 
The second term gives the impact from changes in aggregate auditing cost as 
transmitted by a change in  . In the following we neglect this latter effect under 
the presumption that it is comparatively small.  
n
m
Definition 5.1: Call a variant environmentally sensitive (insensitive) if  
() G,N Q ; Q m E E m Q = < > ∂ ∂ +      0  
such that a small increase in quantity yields a positive (negative) net impact on 
aggregate emissions with changes in outside consumption being taken into account. 
29 
Now, suppose the impact of  g-entry on both types’ production cost is sufficiently 










∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ + < + ⇒ <    (5.6). 
Then, the net increase in emissions is always smaller for a marginal increase in  g-
supply than for an increase in  -supply. Thereby, the substitution effect in (5.5) is 
unambiguously negative, implying that substitution of 
n
g- for  -consumption re-
duces emissions. However, the market size effect remains ambiguous for two rea-
sons. First, the market may expand or shrink for a given net emission impact from 
-consumption. Second, the net emission impact may be positive or negative as 




Proposition 5.1 Suppose (5.6) holds and consider a marginal increase in  . 
Then aggregate emissions are reduced (i), in case of both variants being environ-




g-supply is such that the differentiated sector either shrinks or does not expand by 
too much; (ii), in case of the  -variant being environmentally sensitive but not the  n
g-variant, if substitution takes place such that  -supply decreases and  n g-supply 
increases; and (iii), in case of both variants being environmentally insensitive, if 
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and only if aggregate  g-supply is increased and the change in  -supply is such 




Proof: See Appendix. 
Case (i) of the proposition refers to a situation, in which the differentiated good is 
environmentally sensitive vis-à-vis outside consumption because of relatively high 
marginal emissions even of the  g-variant or because of little influence on outside 
consumption levels. Then, in case of an expanding market, aggregate emissions 
decline if and only if additional emissions generated are more than offset by a de-
crease in the average emission level owing to a sufficient degree of substitution 
towards the  g-variant. Clearly, this implies that  -supply must fall. If the stricter 
qualification level leads to a shrinking of the market, aggregate emissions decrease 
unambiguously. Case (ii) refers to a situation in which only the  -variant is envi-
ronmentally sensitive, whereas 
n
g-consumption is environmentally insensitive. For 
aggregate emissions to decrease in reaction to a tightened qualification level, it is 
then sufficient that substitution of  g- for  -consumption take place, while changes 
in market size are irrelevant. Finally, for case (iii), where both variants of the dif-
ferentiated good are environmentally insensitive, the results from (i) are reversed. 
Now, an expansion of the differentiated market effects a decline in aggregate emis-
sions, whereas a shrinking of the market requires a sufficient degree of substitution 
towards the 
n
g-variant if aggregate emissions are to be reduced.  
In the light of these findings, concerns raised about potentially perverse effects 
of environmental labelling, which are based on the presumption that improvements 
in average environmental performance within the differentiated industry are more 
than offset by the emission increasing effect of an expanding market (Mattoo and 
Singh, 1994; Moraga-González and Padrón-Fumero, 1997), are justified only if 
both variants of the differentiated good are environmentally sensitive vis-à-vis out-
side consumption. Whether this is the case remains an empirical issue. There seems 
to be a focus of current labelling policies on industries for which marginal emis-
sions from the traditional  -variant are above average and emission reduction is 
expected for a sufficient degree of substitution towards the 
n
-variant (OECD 
1991, 1997). However, this falls short from taking into account not only the detri-
mental effects from a potential market expansion but also the relationship to out-
side consumption. From an environmental point of view, there may be a case for 
labelling policies to increase  g-entry into an environmentally insensitive industry. 
Enhanced competition would cause a shift of consumption towards this relatively 
green industry and entail a reduction in aggregate emissions. 
6. Conclusions   28
A model of eco-labelling under an imperfect auditing technology has been studied, 
which integrates asymmetric information on the one hand, and market structure and 
competitive interaction on the other. The model has shown that the traditional Sin-
gle crossing property is neither necessary nor sufficient for separation of the mar-
ket. It may fail to produce an accurate forecast of the actors’ reaction to a change in 
the signal level because it only takes into account the dependency of the actors’ 
incentives on relative profitability between different types. It fails to incorporate 
the incentives’ dependency on absolute profitability, which becomes relevant in the 
case of endogenous market structure.  
The results, as reported in the various propositions, suggest the following. An 
eco-label may help to promote the establishment of a green industry by resolving 
the informational asymmetry at least partially and, thereby, overcoming the prob-
lem of adverse selection. However, the model identifies a number of cases running 
counter to the ‘intuitive’ scenario, in which the lowest separating level of the quali-
fication level maximizes entry of green producers and due to competitive pressure 
minimizes the non-green supply: An increase in the qualification level may (1) 
decrease green supply; (2) increase the degree of pooling and; (3) increase aggre-
gate non-green supply.  
From welfare analysis, which has been omitted from explicit presentation, fol-
low two implications. Excluding environmental damage from analysis, there are 
two types of distortions present in the market outcome relative to first best welfare 
under full information. (1) Asymmetric information reduces welfare directly and 
indirectly. As an unproductive activity only meant to restore symmetric informa-
tion auditing directly reduces aggregate consumption, where  under perfect compe-
tition its cost is fully shifted to consumers. Indirect distortions give rise to too low 
a level of consumption of the differentiated vis-à-vis the outside good and too low 
a level of consumption of the high quality vis-à-vis the low quality variant. (2) En-
try of a firm causes a negative pecuniary externality by raising average cost of all 
other firms in the differentiated industry. Thus, the differentiated industry tends to 
be too large relative to the rest of the economy and its structure is distorted. The 
indirect distortions due to asymmetric information and the pecuniary externality 
may partly offset each other, while the direct utility loss due to the restoration of 
full information is always present. In a second-best setting, in which the labelling 
agency maximizes consumer utility by choosing an optimal value of the qualifica-
tion level, it can be shown that the outcome hinges on the impact on the various 
distortions. In particular, even if there exists a level of the qualification level which 
maximizes high quality entry and thus surplus from high quality consumption, this 
may not be welfare optimal because of too great a level of production cost external-
ities and/or too great an aggregate auditing cost.   29
Analysis of the environmental impact of labelling has brought to the forefront 
the importance of recognizing the trade-off between consumption of the differenti-
ated commodity and outside consumption. Environmental labelling may produce a 
perverse effect, where the improvement of average environmental performance 
brought about by an increase of  g-producers’ market share is more than offset by 
the increase in pollution from an expanding market. However, such effect may 
arise only if both variants of the differentiated good are environmentally sensitive. 
The restriction of analysis to general functional forms precludes the deriving 
of specific solutions. However, the general case provides the most comprehensive 
overview of potential ‘labelling complications’. Any specific problem is readily 
analyzed by placing the appropriate restrictions on the model. While the model was 
motivated by the critique of the signalling approaches to eco-labelling which ig-
nore the role of market structure and entry by considering a monopolist, it may fall 
prey to a parallel critique: Perfect competition seems to be a poor paradigm for 
addressing the creation of new markets. Further studies should clearly encompass 
imperfect competition. Moreover, thus far only the screening case has been consid-
ered. While this matches a situation in which a central agency issues a type I eco-
label, the case of private firm (type II) labels is equally interesting. This requires a 
signalling approach in which firms actively choose a quality index instead of solely 
adopting the qualification level of the eco-index. 
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Appendix 
Proofs 
Proposition 3.1: From (3.1), where aa ju = = 0, (2.2) and (2.4) follows immedi-
ately 
() () pC n G N C g G N G N u =< ∀ ,* , * ,* , * * , *       . 
Hence, according to (2.18) Gu* = 0. QED. 
Proposition 3.2: The proposition is proved by establishing that  a a a ≤ <  is neces-
sary and sufficient for G . From (2.18) and (3.1) follow the conditions   0 > *  31
() ( ) ( ) ( ) a , n A * N *, G , n C a , g A * N *, G , g C + ≤ + ⇒ >   0 G*  (A.1) 
and 
() ( ) ( ) ( )( a , g A * N *, G , g C * N , G* * N , G* σ * N , G* p l ) + ≥ + ⇔ > ϖ   0 G*  (A.2), 
where (A.1) is necessary and (A.2) is necessary and sufficient for G . From 







() ( ) () ( ) a a a , n A N , , n C a , g A N , , g C > ∀ + < +       0 0 0 0  . 
Hence, (A.1) holds for all  a > a . Moreover, because of C  as by (2.3), con-





a a ≤ . Observing that  
() ( )( ) ( ) ( ) a ; a , n A * N *, G , n C * N , G* * N , G* σ * N , G* p l ∀ + ≤ +         ϖ   
it follows from definitions (3.3) and (3.2) and   that the condition in 






a a ≤ < a . Thus,  ]] a , a
min ∈ a * ⇔ > 0 G . QED. 
Proposition 3.3: Part (i) is immediate from (3.7). Part (ii) is proved as follows. 
Totally differentiating  -type’s net revenue from entering the  - instead of the  -
segment, 
n l u
() () π π nl , nu , − , with respect to   yields  a
min
() ( ) [] n










u , n l , n d
− + + =
−
σϖ ε ϖ σ
π π
 (A.3) 
As 0 < ϖ σ N
l
by (2.16), the EWP and, thus the  -type’s net revenue from entering 
the  - instead of the  -segment unambiguously decreases in  . Observe that in 











da  requires that the aggregate impact on the EWP of 
changes in G  and  , as given by the second and third term on the RHS of (A.3), 
exceed the  -type’s marginal auditing cost. This is exactly the condition stated in 
part (ii). Inserting 
min min da * dG da = dG  from (3.7) and 
min min da * dN da dN =  
from (3.9) and collecting terms yields 


























u , n l , n d
 
Comparison with (3.8) shows that the term in brackets gives the derivation of the 
actual change in labelled  -supply from its equilibrium reactivity. Then,  n
0 <
min
l da dN  exactly under the conditions given in (3.8), which by reference   32
back to (A.3) imply part (ii) of the proposition. Finally, from (3.8), 
() 0 0 < ⇐ > −
min
l da * dN γδ αβ . Using  dG dN , as from total differentiation of 
(3.4b),  () () () ( ) ( ) 0 0 > − ⇔ < ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ γδ αβ π π dG dN N l , g G l , g , as implied by 




Proposition 3.5: Part (i) is proved as follows. Totally differentiating  g-profit with 
respect to   yields  
()
g






l , g d
− + + = γ ϖ σ α
π
 (A.4). 
For  0 > α  ( 0 < α )  g-profit increases (decreases) in  g-supply. In equilibrium, 
(A.4) must equal zero. Then, a positive equilibrium reaction 
0 > da dG =
min da
min * dG  requires that the net impact on  g-profit of labelling 
induced changes in  -supply, as given by the second term on the RHS of (A.4) 
exceed (fall short of) 
n
g-type’s marginal auditing cost in the case of   0 < α  
( 0 > α ). This conforms to the condition stated in part (i). Inserting 


























Comparison with (3.12) shows that the term in brackets gives the derivation of the 
actual change in  g-supply from its equilibrium reactivity. Evidently, 
0 >
min da dG  exactly under the conditions given in (3.12) which by reference back 
to (A.4) imply part (i) of the proposition. Part (ii) is proved by analogy. Observing 
the inequalities in (3.10) one sees immediately from (3.12) that   
() 0 0 < + = ∂ ∂ ⇒ > γ ϖ σ π N
min N l da * dG , g   and from (3.13) that 
() 0 0 < = ∂ ∂ ⇐ < α π G l da * dN
min , g  as stated in part (iii). QED. 
Proposition 5.1: We obtain from (4.5) for ζ → 0 
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By (3.7), dG da *
min > 0 for regime 1. For regime 2, it follows from (3.11a) and 


























> min min da * dG da * dN  (A.6)   33
When observing dG da *
min > 0 for and (A.6) for regime 1 and 2, respectively, 
together with definition 5.1, the conditions for the various cases as given in the 
proposition are easily derived from (A.5). QED. 
Abbreviations and Notation 
EWP:  expectations weighted premium 
MRS: marginal rate of substitution 
SCP: single crossing property 
() n , g a , A = θ θ      ,   type specific average auditing cost 
n , g , Aa = θ
θ        type specific marginal change in average auditing cost 
with respect to index-value (= marginal auditing cost) 
[] aa ∈ 0,
max   (eco-) quality index 
a
min     minimum quality index associated with the label (label-
ling requirement) 
a , a    upper and lower boundary value with regard to   in 
between which green entry occurs 
a
min








g ; ; ;   marginal change of type specific average cost in aggregate 
output of green and non-green firms, respectively 
E   aggregate emission level 
m G N E , E , E       marginal emissions from the non-green, green, and out-
side good, respectively 
G, G   aggregate output of green-firms; expected consumption of 
the green  
variant 
D
I  income 
i M =12 , ,...,   index of firms 
jl = ,u   index of market segment with and without label, respec-
tively 
Γ   number of green firms 
Λ   number of non-green firms 
M =+ Γ Λ  aggregate number of firms   34
m  composite outside consumption 
N , N
D   aggregate output of non-green firms; expected consump-
tion of the non-green variant 
p   baseline price = MRS between differentiated and outside 
good with respect to pure consumption  
N G p , p   first derivative of baseline price with regard to aggregate 
output of green and non-green firms, respectively 
u , l j , p j =         price in segment    j
π  profit 
Qj l j
S;,       = u
g n
  aggregate supply in segment    j
() q θ θ ,,       =   type specific capacity 
{} θ ∈ gn ,   quality type (green or non-green) 
σ j  expected share of the green variant in aggregate supply of 
segment    j




G =       σ σ   first derivative of σ j with regard to aggregate output of 
green and non-green firms, respectively 
U  utility 
v  extra private benefit from green consumption 
' ' v , ' v      first and second derivatives of sub-utility v 
ϖ   premium = MRS between extra-benefit and marginal util-
ity of pure consumption of the outside commodity 
N G ,ϖ ϖ   first derivative of the premium with regard to aggregate 
output of green and non-green firms, respectively 
w  sub-utility from pure consumption 
m w , w1   first derivatives of sub-utility   with respect to first and 
second argument 
w
1 1 11 m m mm w , w , w , w   second derivatives of sub-utility   with respect to first 
and second argument 
w
 
 